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Re-Fusing Ethnicity and Religion: 
An Experiment on Tibetan Grounds 
Martin SAXER 
Abstract: The relation between ethnicity and religion has had a troubled 
history in the People’s Republic of China. Conflating religious prac-
tice with ethnic culture is considered to carry the risk of breeding 
“splittism” – especially in Tibet and Xinjiang. While in the post-Mao 
era the outright hostility against religion has given way to a religious 
revival, keeping religion and (nationality) politics separate has re-
mained a major concern for the Chinese Communist Party. Religion 
is supposed to be a private matter that does not interfere with pol-
itics. Against this backdrop, a recent phenomenon in the Tibet Au-
tonomous Region is all the more remarkable: the (re-)fusion of eth-
nicity and religion under the label of cultural heritage and its protec-
tion. This paper approaches this officially endorsed re-fusion ethno-
graphically and examines its wider implications. I argue that endors-
ing religion as an attribute of Tibetan heritage corresponds to the 
concept of defining public spaces and events in which religious prac-
tice is legitimate and expected. Simultaneously, religious practices 
outside these dedicated spaces and events become even more prob-
lematic, leading to everyday Buddhist practices, such as circumambu-
lation, being seen as (and performed as) political acts. 
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Blessing the Skyroad 
Lhasa, late August 2008. On the large square in front of Potala Pal-
ace, images from a photography competition are on display. The 
open-air event is titled “China’s Tibet Qomolangma Photo Exhibi-
tion” and shows photographs taken in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR) and the Tibetan areas of the surrounding provinces.1 
One image captures my attention. It depicts the following scene 
(see <www.chinahighlights.com/image/china-trains/tibettrain.jpg> and 
<www.chinahumanrights.org/Messages/Focus/focus014/6/W02009
0303422498824490.jpg> (6 February 2014)): 
On an elevated track, between vast grasslands and blue Tibetan 
skies, a modern train approaches. A middle-aged Tibetan woman and 
a young girl, meticulously dressed and bravely ignoring the marsh 
between them and the railway line, watch the spectacle with admira-
tion.  
The train, of course, is the Qinghai–Tibet railway. Since 2006 it 
has connected Lhasa with China’s inland provinces. The photographer’s 
name is Chugor; the image won the bronze in the competition. 
When I returned to Lhasa a year later, the exhibition’s second it-
eration was taking place. Together with a selection of award-winning 
photographs from the previous year, Chugor’s image was on display 
again. Chugor himself, the caption explained, had become a judge in 
the 2009 competition. 
In 2011 I stumbled upon the image once more, this time on TV. 
It was used in the context of 60th-anniversary celebrations of Tibet’s 
“Peaceful Liberation”, as the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) in Lhasa is called in China. 
On first sight, the photograph strikes a familiar chord. It speaks 
the language of communist propaganda: Socialist progress reaches the 
rural periphery in the form of modern technology, where it is re-
ceived with enthusiasm and gratitude. However, there is something 
more to this image. The Tibetan woman watching the train carries a 
1 This paper is based on my doctoral research in Tibet between 2007 and 2009. It 
was written during my tenure as a postdoctoral fellow at the Asia Research In-
stitute, National University of Singapore, which was co-funded by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation. I would like to thank Kabir Heimsath, Liang 
Yongjia, and the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this 
paper. 
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prayer wheel. In the 2008 exhibition, the image’s English caption 
read: “Blessing the auspicious skyroad”. In 2009, alluding even more 
directly to religious practice, the caption was changed to “Praying for 
the auspicious skyroad”. The original text in Mandarin remained the 
same both years: zhufu jixiang tianlu; the Tibetan translation changed 
from bkra shis mkha lam gyi rten ‘grel in 2008 to bkris mkha lam la smon 
lam ‘debs in 2009, mirroring approximately the same shift as in Eng-
lish. 
There is no doubt that Tibetan perceptions of the train were 
more ambiguous than this image and the captions suggested. Many 
were critical of the train’s effects on Tibet and there was official con-
cern that this showpiece of Chinese engineering could become a tar-
get for vandals or saboteurs, adding yet another layer of meaning to 
prayers and blessings. In fact, the image’s power derives from dealing 
with precisely this issue: It purports Tibetan consent. 
What I kept turning over in my mind, however, was the fact that 
the image cast religion as an attribute of ethnic identity. 
The post-Mao era has ushered in a revival of religious practice in 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Yet, the party-state has always 
maintained that religion was a private matter and should be kept sep-
arate from politics – especially the politics of ethnic or national iden-
tity. Here, however, a prized photograph in a public exhibition posi-
tioned religion precisely within the highly political context of Tibetan 
support for the PRC’s ambitious development agendas. 
The shift may be subtle, but I argue that the image reflects an 
ongoing experiment of larger scale – the re-fusion of ethnicity and 
religion under the label of protecting cultural heritage (baohu wenhua 
yichan). I refer to it as an “experiment” because it takes place within 
clearly defined spaces and events – laboratory conditions, so to speak. 
The idea of heritage is not new. The particular constellation I am 
concerned with, however, has only recently begun to take shape. I 
argue that in contemporary China, at this juncture, the concept of 
heritage conjures up a new solution to the old dilemma of religion (in 
relation to secular modernism) and ethnic identity (in relation to na-
tional unity). The protocols of identifying, protecting and managing 
cultural heritage suggest themselves to the party-state as familiar and 
safe strategic responses to the ongoing political tensions in Tibet. 
Within the spaces and events defined by the safeguarding and promo-
tion of heritage, religious expressions of Tibetan identity are not just 
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legitimate – they become the expected norm. Outside, however, every-
day practices of Tibetan Buddhism risk being seen as – and are in-
creasingly being performed as – acts of political defiance. 
The Problematisation of Religion and Ethnic 
Identity
There is no question that communist ideology strongly favours secu-
lar modernism over religion. Marx’s writings, although representing 
the most fundamental critique of nineteenth-century bourgeois mo-
dernity, are rife with a fascination for all things modern. As Marshall 
Berman (1983) convincingly demonstrates, Marx’s vision was not to 
leave modern science and technology behind; rather, his hope was 
“to heal the wounds of modernity through a fuller and deeper mod-
ernity”, as Berman puts it (1983). Marx identified religion as an obs-
tacle on this path. In his critique of Hegel, he famously wrote:  
Religion is the moaning of the oppressed creature, the emotion of 
a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the 
opium of the people. Abolishing religion as the illusory happiness of 
the people is demanding their real happiness (Marx and Engels 
1976: 378f, my translation, emphasis in the original). 
On the one hand, this problematisation of religion clearly shaped the 
agendas of communist parties around the world. The visions of a 
secular, modern state in which science replaces religious superstition 
informed notions of development in both the Soviet Union and the 
PRC (see Duara 1995: 85–114). On the other hand, however, the 
nation-building project of such large multi-ethnic states was based on 
imaginaries like the “unshakable friendship of people” or the “family 
of nationalities” in China (Warhola 1991: 262; Bulag 1999, 2006). The 
identity of many of these peoples/ nationalities, however, was deeply 
entangled with religion. Thus, the process of nation-building in both 
the Soviet Union and China transformed Marx’s problematisation of 
religion into a problematisation of religion-cum-nationality or reli-
gion-cum-ethnic identity. The initial strategy in both the Soviet Union 
and China was to separate (unwanted) religion from (essential) ethnic 
identity – for example, by way of presenting “folklore” as the purest 
form of culture (see Gladney 2004: 28, 102–105). 
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The relation between religion and nationality, however, remained 
problematic. Over time, it triggered a variety of strategic responses. 
Below is a brief summary of these responses on the part of the Chi-
nese party-state with regard to Tibet: 
When the PRC established its presence in Tibet in the early 
1950s, the Chinese leadership initially opted not to interfere with the 
practice of Buddhism and to leave the privileges of Tibetan monas-
teries intact. This was part of the 17-Point Agreement that the Tibet-
an government signed in view of the imminent threat of invasion by 
the PLA (Shakya 1999: 33–91). In exchange for the guarantee not to 
interfere with the land and privileges of monasteries and aristocracy, 
the agreement allowed a Chinese takeover without bloodshed – the 
aforementioned so-called “Peaceful Liberation”. Gaining official 
Tibetan agreement to become part of the newly founded PRC was 
more important than doing away with the very theocracy that had 
justified the liberation rhetoric in the first place. The “real happiness” 
associated with secular modernism could wait. 
However, in the long run, religion was seen as an obstacle on the 
path toward communism. When the Dalai Lama met with Mao 
Zedong in 1955, the chairman – paraphrasing Marx – allegedly whis-
pered into His Holiness’ ear, “I understand you very well. But of 
course, religion is poison” (His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin 
Gyatso 1997: 117). 
After the Lhasa uprising in March 1959 that resulted in the Dalai 
Lama’s escape to India, the party-state’s restraint quickly came to an 
end. In the context of the ensuing reforms and the Socialist Educa-
tion Movement of the early 1960s, the monasteries were dismantled, 
the monks branded as parasites. And, as everywhere else in China, 
religion came under intense attack during the Cultural Revolution 
between 1966 and 1976 (see Goldstein 1998; Goldstein, Jiao and 
Lhundrup 2009; Goossaert and Palmer 2011: 167–198). 
With the beginning of the reform period in the late 1970s, the 
hostility against religion began to wane. Hu Yaobang’s visit to Tibet 
in 1980 and his outspoken criticism of the party’s achievements 
sparked a revitalisation in religion, arts and literature (Barnett 2006: 
37). The revised constitution of 1982 finally endorsed protection for 
“normal religious activities” – given that they do not disrupt public 
order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational 
system of the state (PRC 1982: Art. 36). The position that religious 
 186 Martin Saxer 
belief is a citizen’s personal affair and that religion should not be 
mixed with politics – especially the politics of ethnicity – has since 
been reiterated many times (cf. IOSC 1997). 
In the early 1990s, Jiang Zemin suggested that religion, adapted 
where necessary, was not at odds with socialism, and in 2001 Li 
Ruihuan put the role of religion in an even more positive light: In a 
speech on 31 January of that year, he said that much of Chinese cul-
ture was, in fact, related to religion (Goossaert and Palmer 2011: 325–
327). While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) increasingly fore-
grounded the positive sides of religion – social cohesion and psycho-
logical stability for the masses – its role and scope remained tightly 
controlled. Even as religious practice is booming in China, religion 
linked to the construction of ethnic identity is still regarded as highly 
problematic. 
This is most evident in Tibet. The protests in Lhasa between 
1987 and 1990 (Barnett 1994; Schwartz 1994a, 1994b), a series of 
smaller incidents during the 1990s, the riots and demonstrations in 
March 2008 and the self-immolations that have taken place since 
2011 were and are typically led by monks, or at least involved monks 
(Wong 2012). These actions and protests have explicitly linked reli-
gious freedom with a political demand: the return of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama. 
Discovering Heritage 
Until well into the first decade of the twenty-first century, the official 
response to any problem in Tibet was always: more control and ac-
celerated development. The hope was that economically catching up 
with the rest of the country would finally entice Tibetans to enjoy 
modern life and bury their animosities. While private religious prac-
tice within certain limits was tolerated in Tibet as elsewhere in the 
PRC, religion as such was still conceived of as an obstacle to pro-
gress. 
A 2001 white paper entitled Tibet’s March Toward Modernization 
(IOSC 2001), for example, cites American anthropologist Melvyn 
Goldstein (rather out of context) to make the point that the  
universality of religion as the core metaphor of Tibetan national 
identity will be seen […] to be a major factor underlying Tibet’s 
inability to adapt to changing circumstances (IOSC 2001: 3). 
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Beginning around 2005, the tone of the argument started to change. 
Without rejecting the idea of accelerated development, a second and 
much more positive discourse was carefully superimposed onto the 
former. For instance, reporting from the 10th National People’s 
Congress in Beijing in 2007, government news agency Xinhua quoted 
Shi Yongxin, the abbot of the famous Shaolin Temple, who argued 
that Buddhism could make a substantial contribution to building a 
“harmonious society”. “Chinese culture values the concept of har-
mony, which is quite similar to Buddhist doctrines”, he said. “That’s 
why Buddhism is popular in China” (Wang 2007). Christian leaders 
Yu Wenliang and Liu Deshen quickly chimed in, stressing the posi-
tive contribution of religion to a “harmonious society” (Wu 2007). 
In this vein, Tibetan Buddhism started to be presented as some-
thing valuable, worth fostering, and in no way contrary to economic 
development. China Daily (2008) published an interview with Lei 
Jufang, the Chinese director of Cheezheng, the largest Tibetan medi-
cine company. Lei Jufang, a successful business woman, is portrayed 
as a devout Buddhist who finds great joy in worshipping in Tibetan 
monasteries. 
A government white paper from 2008 entitled Protection and De-
velopment of Tibetan Culture directly contradicts the white paper from 
2001 cited above. Religion is no longer cast as just a private affair. 
The white paper states crisply and clearly: “The state has placed Ti-
betan Buddhism under effective protection as part of traditional Tibetan 
culture” (IOSC 2008, emphasis added). 
The framework in which this shift took place is the notion of 
heritage. Note that it is not Buddhist practice as an aspect of everyday 
culture in Tibet that the white paper refers to; it is Tibetan Buddhism 
as part of traditional Tibetan culture – in other words, cultural heri-
tage worth being preserved. 
This raises two questions: Why has the concept of heritage be-
come so important? And why has this shift taken place at this particu-
lar time? I argue that three events led to these developments: 
First, in 2005 the Hu Jintao leadership declared the concept of a 
“harmonious society” to be the guiding principle for future develop-
ment. The concept is meant to describe a holistic approach to devel-
opment that takes into account not only economic growth but also 
social harmony, ecological balance and even spiritual development. It 
can be understood as a response to the negative ecological and social 
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side effects of rapid growth and has become a key concept of Hu 
Jintao’s legacy. This rhetoric of a “harmonious society” sets the larger 
framework in which religion can be positioned as a positive force for 
the overall development, as Shi Yongxin did at the People’s Congress 
in 2007. 
Second, around 2005 China started to gear up much more inten-
sively for the Beijing Olympic Games scheduled for 2008. The 
Games were widely perceived as a prime opportunity to show the 
positive face of a new China to the world. In this context, the issue of 
ethnic identity had gained a new dimension. The “Tibet issue” (and 
to a lesser extent the “Xinjiang issue”) and the question of human 
rights were identified as major obstacles to presenting this new China 
to the world. Whenever a Chinese leader visits a Western country, the 
question of whether human rights has been properly addressed is 
always brought up. Whenever the Dalai Lama travels, the question is 
always whether a given Western leader is brave enough to meet with 
him despite Chinese protests and threats. 
Third, in 2003 UNESCO extended its agenda from the protec-
tion of cultural heritage sites (buildings, places) to intangible cultural 
expressions. The Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heri-
tage (UNESCO 2003) encourages the listing and protection of festi-
vals, dances, literary works, and so on. With the inclusion of intan-
gible culture, the notion of heritage now suggests itself as a compre-
hensive, globally accepted approach to “culture”. It establishes “cul-
ture” as a reservoir of protectable items, including religion and vari-
ous aspects of ethnic identity. 
China was among the very first countries to ratify the convention 
in 2004. Since then, the official catalogue of facets of intangible cul-
tural heritage has been growing steadily. Many Tibetan items are 
listed, including religious festivals, the epic of King Gesar, and several 
Tibetan medicines. 
The concept of heritage and its protection does not contradict 
development, progress or a scientific approach. The 2003 UNESCO 
convention explicitly calls for “the identification, documentation, 
research, preservation, protection, promotion, enhancement, trans-
mission [… and] revitalization of the various aspects of such heri-
tage” (UNESCO 2003: Art. 2.3). In other words, the concept renders 
religion and ethnicity as objects of study, promotion and manage-
ment. This ties in well with official development agendas. It helps 
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promote ethnic displays as tourist attractions in order to generate 
income (see, for example, Oakes 1998: 149) and it resonates with the 
party-state’s continuing belief in the regulation and control of reli-
gious activity (cf. Birnbaum 2003). Categorising ethnic identity and 
religion as aspects of heritage promises to produce results in accord-
ance with the quest for both continuing progress and national unity 
and harmony. 
However, this new classification ties the question of religion to 
the politics of ethnic identity, whether or not this was intended. The 
white paper Development and Protection of Tibetan Culture that locates 
religion as part of traditional Tibetan culture, for example, was expli-
citly written in response to the rebellion of March 2008 and the Dalai 
Lama’s reiterated claim that a cultural genocide was going on in Tibet 
(Eimer and Chamberlain 2008; Coonan 2008; Indo-Asian News Service 
2010). 
“Traditional Tibetan culture” as a framework in which religion 
should be “protected” is by no means apolitical. It is precisely the 
preservation of culture, more than the political status of Tibet, that 
has become the core political issue of the Tibet question. Tying reli-
gion to the preservation of Tibetan culture (rather than tolerating 
religion as a personal affair) subverts the efforts to separate religion 
from politics. 
Strategic Interventions 
The concept of cultural heritage, of course, predates the transfor-
mation I am concerned with here. At least since UNESCO’s founda-
tion, after World War II, the notion of cultural heritage has had 
strong institutional backing. Safeguarding cultural heritage was pri-
marily understood as identifying and protecting particular sites of a 
universal world heritage – cultural or natural. UNESCO’s logo, a 
stylised Greek temple in which the letters UNESCO represent the 
columns, is a testament to this original agenda. It was, however, not 
until the 2003 convention on intangible cultural heritage that the 
organisation extended its reach beyond the protection of tangible 
heritage sites. This extension has implications for the actual process 
of heritage-making. 
The older mode of defining heritage sites implies a specific kind 
of spatial intervention: the demarcation of territory to be safeguarded. 
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The demarcation of territory usually includes entry procedures, tickets, 
and areas off-limits to the public. 
Such interventions can be described as “strategic” in de Cer-
teau’s sense (de Certeau 1988). Embedded in institutions and their 
power calculations, strategies depend on a “proper” – a distinct spa-
tial localisation such as an enterprise, scientific laboratory, clinic or 
factory – from which relations with an exterior environment are de-
fined. “The ‘proper’ is a victory of space over time”, writes de Cer-
teau (1988). In the same vein, the strategic intervention of creating a 
heritage site aims to protect it from the temporal effects of decay, 
destruction and vandalism. The strategic intervention thereby reor-
ders relations with the exterior. 
Figure 1: Potala Entry Formalities 
Source: © Martin Saxer 2007. 
Consider the Potala Palace in Lhasa: As a world heritage site, listed by 
UNESCO in 1994 (cf. Shepherd 2006), the former seat of the Dalai 
Lama and the symbol of the unified worldly and religious power of 
the Tibetan Ganden Phodrang (dga’ ldan pho brang) government has be-
come the most recognised emblem of Tibet. Its relations to the ex-
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terior have been completely reordered: As a heritage site, the Potala is 
devoid of any connotation to its “feudal” and “theocratic” past. 
The extension of the concept of heritage to include the domain 
of the intangible means that such interventions are no longer neces-
sarily spatial. Temporal events such as religious festivals and rituals 
are now also potential targets of heritage protection. 
There was no radical break in tone or method that accompanied 
the extension of heritage to the intangible world. Safeguarding proce-
dures have remained more or less the same: extensive documentation, 
applications, committees, lists of items to be protected, and so on. 
This probably helped to smooth the way for the quick adoption of 
intangible cultural heritage. However, the inclusion of intangible ob-
jects of protection made heritage discourse much more pervasive. 
The notion of intangible cultural heritage is easily applied and thereby 
promises legitimacy to a variety of endeavours, ranging from local, 
grass-roots initiatives to large, state-sponsored programmes. 
The point I seek to make is simple: It is this pervasive extension 
of heritage discourse to the domain of the intangible that promised a 
fresh approach to the set of problems related  to religion and ethnic 
identity in China. It heralds a familiar, well-tested and now ethically 
certified “global form” (Collier and Ong 2005: 11ff) to dealing with 
those issues. 
The modality of heritage logic remains one of segregation or 
compartmentalisation: Selecting a site or an event to be safeguarded, 
be it formally or informally, reorders its relations to the exterior; the 
effect of the selection is therefore felt far beyond the limits of the 
protected item itself. 
Let me explain this modality of segregation and its effects by way 
of three examples. 
“Living Buddhas” 
One of the areas in which problems related to religion and the pol-
itics of ethnic identity has always been particularly visible and acute is 
the Tibetan institution of the tulku (sprul sku) – the reincarnate lama, 
Rinpoche, or “living Buddha”, as Chinese translations usually put it. 
Besides the most famous and influential reincarnate lineages of the 
Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and the Karmapa, there are probably 
several hundred highly venerated tulku lineages in Tibetan Buddhism. 
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Tulkus not only have religious authority, they also have a large influ-
ence on worldly matters – and their authority, by definition, lies be-
yond the influence of the party. 
The question of how incarnations should be chosen is therefore 
of great political significance. The party-state has invested much ef-
fort in gaining authority over the process of selection. However, these 
efforts have largely failed. The 17th Karmapa, although selected with 
Beijing’s consent, chose to flee to India at the age of 14, and the offi-
cial 11th Panchen Lama has not been able to gain much trust among 
Tibetans, as the boy that the Dalai Lama had acknowledged to be the 
true incarnation was taken away by Chinese authorities to an un-
known location. In brief, more government control has not translated 
into more religious authority, and the most recent development will 
probably not help in this respect: In 2007, the State Administration 
for Religious Affairs set out guidelines for the “management of the 
reincarnation of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism”. The guide-
lines require all tulkus to register should they intend to reincarnate any 
time soon (SARA 2007). 
The guidelines, however, are more a reiteration of an old de-
mand than a radically new development. The party-state has always 
insisted on being consulted and having the last word in the process of 
selection of reincarnate lamas. The main historical argument brought 
forward is that rulers as far back as the Manchu emperor had a cus-
tomary right to give their final blessings to the selection of a new 
Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama. According to Chinese authorities and 
scholars, the only correct system of selecting the right incarnation is 
by drawing lots from a golden urn that the emperor had gifted the 
Tibetan government in the eighteenth century (Rockhill 1910: 58, 65f; 
Waddell 1910: 80f). The state argues that influential Tibetan lamas 
should pay tribute to Beijing as they did during Manchu rule and 
accept the party’s authority (Shakya 1999: 444). 
Recently, however, the reincarnation system has been embraced 
as part of Tibetan cultural heritage. Now, it is praised as “a unique 
way to pass on Tibetan Buddhism” that has “received respect from 
the state” (IOSC 2008: 15). From this official Chinese perspective, 
keeping the golden urn is a matter of “authentic Tibetanness” – re-
gardless of the Dalai Lama’s views. In 2009, the Dalai Lama stated 
publicly that the reincarnation system was only relevant as long as 
Tibetans regarded it as such, and that there were also other ways to 
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choose his successor. In other words, the role and title of the Dalai 
Lama are a political institution. The party-state quickly portrayed this 
as a distortion of authentic Tibetan religious and cultural practice (see 
Wong 2009). 
The rhetoric of intangible cultural heritage has thus added a new 
twist to the debate: The exiled spiritual leader stands for change while 
the CCP presents itself as the defender of authentic Tibetanness. 
Monastic Debate 
The second example of the modality of compartmentalisation implicit 
in heritage-making is Buddhist debate in the “dharma grove”, the 
debating courtyard or chöra (chos ra) of a Tibetan monastery. Debate is 
integral to monastic education. It is part of the daily curriculum, and 
traditionally it serves as a means of examination. The fame of many a 
great scholar-monk in the history of Tibetan Buddhism was built 
upon his debating skills. Although only a small fraction of the monk 
population in old Tibet actively trained to become scholars, the 
greatness of a monastic institution was measured by the intellectual 
acuity of these few (Goldstein 1998: 21). 
The setting of monastic debate is decisively simple but effective. 
It involves two people, the defender (dam bca’ ba), who sits on the 
ground, and the challenger (rigs lam pa), who stands and asks ques-
tions. With the first question, the defender takes a stance, which he 
then defends on the grounds of Buddhist logic. The challenger con-
tinues to ask questions, trying to entangle the defender in contradic-
tions. The challenger underscores his questions by clapping his 
hands, which gives the entire scene its very special atmosphere. While 
the defender is held accountable for everything he says, the challenger 
is free to change positions in order to find a crack in the defender’s 
thesis. Other monks listen in and their reactions to the two oppon-
ents’ arguments play an eminent role (cf. Perdue 1992: 28–32). 
Monastic education came under pressure after 1959 and was 
completely abolished with the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Only 
in the mid-1980s did the monastic dharma groves tentatively start to 
be used again. Even then, the Democratic Management Committees 
(dmangs gtso bdag gnyer u yon lhan khang) proceeded with great caution. 
Party officials in the TAR remained suspicious of a revival of monas-
tic education, regardless of whether Beijing’s new policies would al-
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low it or not (Goldstein 1998: 25ff). Monastic education and debate 
remained sensitive issues. In the monk-led protests at the end of the 
1980s many of the young protestors, including the most gifted among 
them, were indeed from a new generation of scholar-monks who had 
studied at Drepung Monastery. Party hardliners saw their concerns 
confirmed: The dharma grove was a breeding ground for dissent. 
Monastic education sharpens a sense of logic beyond the reach of the 
party and a sense of commitment outside any loyalty to socialism. 
Despite all these difficulties, the practice of debate has contin-
ued. As a matter of fact, watching a debate is part of the standard 
tourist itinerary in Tibet and many visitors get a chance to witness 
monks debating. 
The afternoon debate at Sera Monastery in Lhasa is famous in 
this respect. A hundred or more monks gather in the monastery’s 
beautiful debating courtyard. Old trees provide shade and the noise 
of the city is far away. Along the walls of the courtyard, scores of 
tourists equipped with heavy cameras line up to catch a glimpse of 
this old tradition that has survived amidst a rapidly modernising Lha-
sa, a stubborn realm of monastic, “old” Tibet amidst increasing gov-
ernment control. Or at least, this is how it appears. 
Eighteen months after the riots of March 2008, I visited Sera 
Monastery with a Tibetan friend. He had brought his Tibetan girl-
friend, a real estate agent. Between worshipping, drinking tea and 
taking pictures of debating monks, we discussed the situation in Lhasa. 
In autumn 2009 tensions were high. Armed patrols and checkpoints 
were omnipresent in the city’s Tibetan quarters, and the much-despis-
ed re-education campaigns in the monasteries, which forced monks 
to denounce their spiritual leader, continued. I said that I was actually 
surprised to see that the monks were still allowed to debate. Knowing 
some of the monks, my friend burst out laughing and replied: “Al-
lowed to debate? They are told to debate!” 
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Figure 2: Debating at Sera Monastery in Lhasa 
Source: © Martin Saxer 2009. 
In other words, what we were seeing was not simply traditional mo-
nastic education. It was traditional monastic education repackaged as 
Buddhist spectacle in the name of cultural heritage: Come see the 
monks debate, 3 p.m. daily at Sera’s dharma grove. Also on YouTube. 
But is it truly that simple? Do those who decide whether the 
monks’ debates go on or not have any understanding of or control 
over its content? Do order and authority preclude opportunity and 
agency? Furthermore, what is the difference in monastic discipline 
between now and then? Regardless of these questions, the sarcastic 
tone of my friend’s reply reflected a widespread feeling among Tibet-
ans – namely, that “religious freedom” was an empty slogan and that 
the official preoccupation with presenting Tibet to outside visitors 
disregarded Tibetans’ opinions and needs.  
The latter was a feeling that had been growing for years. In 2006, 
the Dalai Lama appealed to all Tibetans to stop using the fur-rimmed 
robes usually worn at important festivals. Hunting rare wild animals 
was not compatible with the principle of Buddhist compassion. This 
appeal conflicted with demands by local authorities in the PRC that 
Tibetans continue wearing their festive robes, as this was an ancient 
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tradition. In Yushu, Tibetans were fined for not wearing their tradi-
tional dress during the annual horse-racing festival in 2006 (Macart-
ney 2007). A similar situation resulted in 2009, when the decision of 
many Tibetans to forgo celebrating Losar, the traditional Tibetan 
New Year, was seen as act of civil disobedience by the party-state. 
Tibetan blogger Woeser (2009) wrote that these forms of disobedi-
ence were “the weapons of the weak”, a nod to the title of James 
Scott’s well-known book (Scott 1985). In 2011, eight monks from 
Zurmang Monastery in Yushu Prefecture (Qinghai) were arrested, 
allegedly for distributing flyers that called for a boycott of an upcom-
ing festival; they argued that after the devastating earthquake in 2010 
there was nothing to celebrate (RFA 2011; Tibetan Review 2011). 
These incidents of “resisting culture” (see also Saxer 2012, 2013) 
suggest that the interventions in the name of safeguarding Tibetan 
Buddhist heritage have transformed the roles of its main actors. De-
bate that used to be sensitive and only barely tolerated by the state 
has become – within the limits of a defined heritage space – a re-
quired exercise. Dressing Tibetan and celebrating Tibetan festivals is 
now – within the limits of a defined heritage event – expected and 
encouraged behaviour. 
Or, in more general and bold terms: Previously, Tibetan religion 
and culture could be practised only under the condition that stability 
and harmony were not jeopardised; today, not performing elements 
of Tibetan (Buddhist) heritage can be seen as jeopardising stability 
and harmony. 
Beyond Heritage 
The modalities of the subtle transformation of religion into an aspect 
of cultural heritage are the site and the event. As monastic debate 
already has an event-like character and is bound to a site (the dharma 
grove), it lends itself effortlessly to this transformation. Much of every-
day Buddhist practice, however, is less suited for such a transfor-
mation. The questions are whether and how cultural heritage dis-
course affects private everyday practices outside defined events and 
spaces. How does the demarcation of a strategic “proper” redefine 
relations with the exterior? 
Consider circumambulation, the practice of walking around a  
sacred place in a clockwise direction. Doing kora – skor ba byed, as the 
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Tibetans call it – can include anything from the routine morning walk 
of elderly Tibetans around a local stupa or the casual stroll of a group 
of friends around a monastery, to the strenuous practice of circum-
ambulating Mount Kailash in a series of prostrations. Circumambula-
tion is an integral part of everyday life in Tibet. Even the practice of 
keeping religious sites to one’s right when passing by them is a form 
of doing kora. 
In Lhasa, there are three concentric circumambulation routes 
around the spiritual centre of the city, the statue of Buddha Sakya-
muni known as Jowo Rinpoche (jo bo rin po che) in the central Jokhang 
Temple. The closest of these three circuits is the one around the statue 
inside the monastery; the second is the busy market street known as 
Barkor (bar skor, literally: the “middle circle”) that leads around the 
Jokhang Temple. These two paths are clearly visible as devotional 
routes. There is a steady stream of pilgrims using them. However, the 
third circuit, called Lingkor (gling skor), leads around the entire city 
along the broad boulevards that form the main axes of traffic in Lhasa. 
Figure 3: On the Lingkor 
Source: © Martin Saxer 2008. 
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Approaching Lhasa, the Jokhang, and Jowo Rinpoche, it is customary 
to begin with the outer circuit and then proceed to the middle and 
finally the inner circuit. Thus, the outer circuit remains very im-
portant. Groups of pilgrims walking along these busy roads at the 
beginning of their ritual approach to the spiritual centre of the Tibet-
an world are a very common sight. In addition, many residents of 
Lhasa also use the outer circuit to do kora. Compared to the pilgrims, 
who often carry prayer wheels or prayer beads and whose appearance 
bears the marks of their arduous journeys, they are not as easily iden-
tifiable as worshippers. A typical sight of Lhasa residents on the outer 
circuit would be a group of two or three middle-aged women carrying 
umbrellas against the sun and wearing face masks against the dust. 
The masks, however, serve yet another purpose – to protect the pri-
vacy of those doing kora from the many CCTV cameras installed in 
the city. 
Circumambulation is not illegal. It does not convey any apparent 
political message, nor does it interfere with the “state’s education 
system”. Doing kora is a prototypical private religious practice expli-
citly protected by the PRC’s constitution. Yet, as a private religious 
practice performed in public, it is a potential stage for political protest 
and has been used as such before (Barnett 1994: 245–249; Schwartz 
1994a: 26–33). Thus, whenever a special event is coming up, party 
members, people working in government offices, teachers and stu-
dents are advised against doing kora. And, through a vague sense of 
anticipatory obedience, this advice is also taken to be valid for the 
families of all of the above groups. 
At one point, for example, a friend who had resigned from a 
government job and ran his own business complained to me that his 
wife had begged him to stop his casual evening strolls around the 
Potala – another favourite circumambulation route in Lhasa – for the 
time being. His wife was working for China Mobile and had been 
advised not to do kora at the moment. She considered it inappropri-
ate for any family member to do so. My friend, a business-minded 
man in his early thirties educated in Shanghai, was neither a particu-
larly devout Buddhist nor an outspoken activist. Vacillating on the 
matter of whether he should give in to his wife’s request, he realised 
that kora had been transformed from a simple activity with a pleasant 
and casual religious dimension to a political expression of dissent. 
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Pilgrimage is another case in point. Just as doing kora, going on 
pilgrimage includes a broad palette of activities, ranging from the 
journey of a lifetime on foot across Tibet to casual weekend trips 
with family and friends to places of religious importance. And just as 
with circumambulation, going on pilgrimage is a private religious 
activity without any obvious political dimension. However, over the 
past few years, and especially since 2008, increasing efforts to control 
the movement of Tibetans in Tibet have rendered pilgrimage increas-
ingly difficult. Many new roadside checkpoints have been erected, 
and stories of pilgrims having been sent back to or expelled from 
Lhasa abound. Pressure on hotel owners to accommodate only those 
with valid documentation is high. In 2009, for example, hotel owners 
catering to Tibetan customers were instructed to install devices that 
would read the new Chinese identity cards and allow for instant 
transmission of the data to the authorities. 
Temporal restrictions on freedom of movement are nothing new 
in Tibet. However, their selectiveness and pervasiveness have gained 
a new dimension. While much is being done to facilitate easy access 
for Chinese (and, to a lesser extent, foreign) tourists to the sites of 
Tibetan Buddhist heritage, the movement of Tibetan pilgrims – espe-
cially their access to Lhasa – has become considerably more compli-
cated. 
Conclusions 
The problem of religion in relation to the politics of ethnic identity 
has haunted the PRC since its foundation. It has triggered a variety of 
responses on the part of the state, ranging from outright hostility 
against everything religious to a more moderate position endorsing 
private religious practice. Including religious practices and ethnic 
identity under the umbrella of “heritage” is the latest of these re-
sponses. 
There are several reasons why the concept of heritage – or, more 
concretely, its extension to the domain of the intangible – suggests 
itself as a new solution to an old problem. It offers a counter-thesis to 
the allegations that a “cultural genocide” is taking place in Tibet; the 
methods of management and protection do not look or feel new; and 
the sites and events to which heritage is confined promise a high 
degree of legibility and control. Under these circumstances, fusing 
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religion with ethnic identity – whether intentionally or simply as a 
side effect of other agendas – seems like a safe experiment. 
However, the laboratory conditions are an illusion. The political 
dimension of defining religion as part of Tibetan cultural heritage 
does not stop at the laboratory’s door. Creating heritage thoroughly 
reconfigures the limits of what authorities in Tibet consider to be 
expected and problematic behaviour – be it celebrating a religious 
festival, wearing certain clothes, doing kora or debating in the dharma 
grove. The strategy’s “proper” redefines relations to the exterior. The 
bounded heritage site or event affects its surroundings, and religious 
practices formerly considered harmless and private become political 
acts of dissent. 
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